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ESSAYS
THE ETHICAL WORLDS OF
LARGE-FIRM LITIGATORS:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Robert W. Gordon**
INTRODUCTION
N this essay I summarize my preliminary and necessarily tentative
observations and conclusions gathered from participating in the
ABA's Ethics: Beyond the Rules Task Force's project of interview re-
search on the ethics of litigation practice.
In the project's first year, we interviewed large-firm litigation law-
yers, both partners and associates, selected from firms in two major
cities. In the second year, we interviewed samples of those who most
often meet large-firm lawyers in litigation settings: trial judges, in-
cluding a few magistrates, plaintiffs' lawyers, and in-house counsel,
from the same two cities.1
We were looking for whatever could be learned, through informal
interviews of a sample of the lawyers and judges involved in litigation,
about the prevalence and likely causes of, and possible remedies for,
ethically inappropriate or problematic behavior in large-firm litigation
practice, especially in the area of discovery.2 I use this vague formula-
tion deliberately, to underscore our interest in areas of problematic
* Reprinted by permission. © 1998 American Bar Association. All rights
reserved.
** Johnston Professor of Law and History, Yale University. Like everyone in-
volved with the ABA Section of Litigation's Special Task Force on Ethics: Beyond the
Rules, I am enormously indebted to the Section and to the personal enthusiasm and
encouragement of Lawrence Fox, the Section leader who initiated this project, which
was funded and sustained through his efforts and those of his successor. I am also
grateful for the insights and contributions to our Task Force of the Section's leaders
and facilitators, Don Hilliker, Peter Glenn, and Douglas Frenkel, and of my fellow
academics on the project, especially Austin Sarat, who commented on an earlier draft
of this paper.
1. Quotations of statements by study participants are taken from the author's
notes or from the transcripts of the study's structured group discussions. The tran-
scripts, which are confidential to protect the identities of study participants, are on file
with Professor Robert Nelson of the American Bar Foundation. For a brief descrip-
tion of the study, see Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of
Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L Rev. 837, 83842 (1998).
2. The decision was made to focus the study on large-firm litigators because bar-
discipline authorities and researchers have tended in the past to concentrate attention
on the ethics of small or solo practitioners, and because several well-publicized recent
instances of ethical lapses among large-firm litigators have called attention to
problems at that level of practice.
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conduct "beyond the rules" as well as in plain violations of ethical and
practice rules.
We have learned, I think, something about all of these areas from
our research so far. Not surprisingly, what we have learned is much
more about how lawyers and judges perceive and talk about ethical
problems or the lack of them than about ethical problems themselves.
I. THE WORLD ACCORDING TO LARGE-FIRM LAWYERS
I shall begin with the world of litigation practice as it appears to the
main objects our study: large-firm lawyers. This part examines these
lawyers' views on clear-cut and ambiguous issues, what causes lawyers
to commit ethical violations, and what solutions are possible.
A. The Standard "Take"
The lawyers we interviewed generally held a set of attitudes that
one could call their dominant, standard, or official position on ethi-
cally problematic behavior-the default position or attitude of repose
that they usually started with in interview sessions and often settled
back upon at the end.
Large-firm lawyers' standard take on ethics is that ethically prob-
lematic behavior is very rare at their level of practice for several rea-
sons, the most important of which are that:
1. Ethically inappropriate behavior (in the standard take) is defined
narrowly as a violation of the rules.' Any eyebrow-raising behavior
that is not a rule violation is classified as a matter of questionable
"morality" or "bad manners" or "hardball" or "asshole" behavior, a
defect or mannerism of individual character or personality.
2. Given the basic norm of the adversary system, which is the duty
of zealous representation of client interests within the rules, much of
what is characterized as aggressive or "hardball" behavior is legiti-
mate and functional in view of valid litigation objectives and the con-
ventional norms of the adversary game. "You stay within the rules; to
the extent it's within the rules, you have a duty to do everything you
can for the client's interest." "We accept that adhering to the rules [of
an ancient and tested process] does achieve a good [at the system
level]."
3. Lawyering is separated from its substantive ends by defining its
functions as following the rules of a procedural game. Any given liti-
gation is not a process for vindicating moral claims, discovering truth,
achieving just results, or avoiding harmful consequences. Responsibil-
3. See generally Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) (outlining dis-
ciplinary rules that specify the minimum level of ethical conduct below which no law-
yer may fall without being subject to disciplinary action); Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1995) (stating the standards of professional conduct by which lawyers must
abide).
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ity for the morality or justice of a claim is ultimately the client's. The
lawyer's job begins and ends with advising the client of the likely legal
consequences of his decisions and helping him achieve his aims within
the limits of applicable legal rules. For example, lawyers stated:
"You're not hired to give moral advice." "We're not moral judges of
our clients." "We're trained to be an advocate." "There is morality,
but it is not the domain of lawyers." "Our system of justice is not
established for the purpose of moral judgments, but to determine facts
and to apply law to facts." "We are a competitive bunch. Litigation is
a zero-sum game; we are not truth-seekers." "If clients are going to
lie to me, they are going to lie to me; am I going to try to be a mind-
reader? ... I would hope they would be honest with me; it's not my
responsibility to guide them to decision." In speaking of themselves
or their clients, the lawyers are much more at ease using the "tough"
terms of consequentialist cost-benefit analysis instead of the "soft"
and "vague" terms of ethics and morality. "The client doesn't want to
have a moral dialogue with me .... You have to frame it in other
ways, explain the trouble you can get into: 'Looking down the road as
your counsel, if you kill people you're going to have liability."' Mor-
alizing lawyers are not to be trusted: "Sanctimonious lawyers are the
first to file Rule 11 motions, accuse you of being unethical."
4. If ethically problematic behavior is limited to rule-violation, thus
making it necessarily rare because: (a) the rules are mostly clear, thus
it is easy for lawyers (and outside monitors) to tell when they have
stepped over the line; and (b) lawyers and their clients, if properly
advised by counsel, have a clear self-interest in complying with the
rules because the costs of being detected in violations rarely justify
either lawyer or client in taking the risk. "Concealment [of material
information in discovery] may not be in the best interest of the client
in the long run." "The risks [of suppression of relevant matter in dis-
covery] are tremendous." Ethical behavior may also aid the firm's
interest in its reputation, which in turn is an asset to clients: "We want
to be able to settle [civil tax cases that might turn into criminal prose-
cutions] on the basis that our representations are in fact the case."
5. Unethical behavior is most uncommon at the level of large-firm
law practice, because such firms are likely to have cultures, training
procedures, and institutional safeguards (such as firm ethics commit-
tees) that promote ethical practices while discouraging and sanction-
ing unethical practices.
While speaking in this "official" mode, our lawyer-informants
treated the actual stories we used of ethically problematic conduct
(usually involving suppression or concealment of relevant evidence in
discovery) by large-firm lawyers as either not really raising ethical
problems at all or else as isolated examples of lawyers being "stupid,"
that is, failing to take adequate account of the downside risks to them-
selves and to their clients of rule violations.
1998]
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B. Beyond the Standard Take: Gray Areas
The "standard take," however, turns out to be an outer wall of de-
fense, which, if breached, gives way to a more shadowy and interesting
ethical landscape. Once invited to go into more detail about specific
contexts of their practices, our lawyer-informants revealed a consider-
ably more varied and complex ethical world than the standard account
of a practice where the rules are clear: violating them is dumb and
counterproductive, and any conduct that does not violate the rules is
"okay." Actual litigation practice, not surprisingly, involves many
"gray areas" calling for complex discretionary judgment. Our infor-
mants described compliance with the ethics rules as a "floor." They
held aspirations for their own conduct or the conduct of other lawyers
they worked or dealt with as a higher standard. They distinguished
between more and less legitimate aggressive tactics, between savory
and unsavory practices, and between civilly cooperative and nastily
obstructive practice.
For the most part, because these distinctions are so specific to con-
text, it is hard to generalize about them. One example is the distinc-
tion between the defensive tactic of asking for a break in depositions
in order to throw off a questioner's rhythm and give a witness time to
think (generally believed legitimate), and asking for a break while a
question is pending, continually going off the record, threatening sanc-
tions, and yelling and screaming (not legitimate).
When you get warm, they throw up roadblocks, attack you person-
ally... blow up, throw out some smoke, "let's go talk to the judge,
you're attacking the witnesses," keep the questioner from getting
comfortable. I do this to some extent, but as a matter of personal
style, I won't raise my voice or attack [the adversary's] integrity ....
Others feel very free to threaten sanctions, [engage in] high-pitched
yelling .... Others do it nicely, but continually go off the record,
throw up roadblocks.
Nevertheless, some general principles emerged. For example, it is
considered fair play to use tactics that throw opponents or their wit-
nesses off balance or that raise costs to the other side, so long as the
tactic, even though mainly adopted for strategic purposes, has some
more-than-minimal relation to an arguably legitimate purpose as well.
One may ask the embarrassing question, "Why were you fired from
your last job?," if it has some arguable relevance, but not if it is
designed to harass. The general principle guiding discovery requests
for documents is that defense counsel may not flatly lie or hide docu-
ments, but they are entitled to be "aggressive," make the plaintiff's
lawyer "work for what he wants," and withhold from relieving the
plaintiffs' lawyers of the burden of preparing his own case." Thus, the
defense may not conceal, destroy, or deny the existence of specifically
requested documents that they know exist, but is fully entitled to ob-
ject to such requests as over-broad or unduly burdensome, to attempt
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to narrow such requests and take advantage of ambiguity or vague-
ness in requests to supply only what is specifically asked for.
An inventory of undesirable behaviors (starting with the most seri-
ous and descending to the more trivial) would run something like this:
(1) plain dishonesty, such as making representations about facts that
turn out to be untrue or promises about future conduct that are bro-
ken; (2) unjustified "hardball," such as threatening sanctions without
plausible cause or constant interruptions of questioning or instructions
to witnesses; (3) gratuitous uncooperativeness, such as refusing rea-
sonable requests for rescheduling or sending briefs by ordinary mail
instead of messenger; and (4) tactical unpleasantness or bad manners,
such as screaming, insulting, patronizing junior or female lawyers, and
macho posturing.
Our informants seemed to agree with many of these distinctions.
They reported a consensus in the upper echelons of the litigation bar
about the kinds of tactics that distinguish ethical, honest, legitimately
aggressive, and civil styles of practice from borderline, unscrupulous,
sleazy, hyper-aggressive "hardball" and "asshole" practice. There are
hard fighting but clean and fair ways of behaving in discovery, and sly,
underhanded, dirty ways. In the gray areas, not all cats are gray.
On many other issues, however, our informants did not agree. In all
of our interview sessions, we detected major disagreements in the
views of even this very high-minded segment of the litigation bar
about some of the basic ground rules and limits of litigation practice.4
A tentative hypothesis is that a fault-line exists between those lawyers
who are willing to be relatively passive in ethical manners and those
lawyers who are somewhat more active. Passive lawyers may leave
completely up to the client how to exercise discretion in difficult gray-
area judgments. Active lawyers, on the one hand, may try to guide
clients towards relatively more honest, forthcoming, cooperative, and
civil strategies, or may adopt those strategies themselves in case of
ambiguity or default, unless clients clearly instruct them otherwise. In
the very first set of project interviews, for example, our informants
described a range of approaches that they might use when establishing
whether a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation for the
purpose of deciding whether to claim privilege. They could:
1. ask the client open-ended questions without suggesting the an-
swer that will favor the claim of privilege;
2. ask the client leading questions that are designed to produce the
favorable response;
3. explain the legal consequences to the client and advise the client
to tell the truth, whatever the consequences;
4. explain the legal consequences to the client and leave entirely to
the client the decision about whether to tell the truth;
4. This is an area that I would be very interested in exploring further.
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5. explain the legal consequences to the client and advise the client
to tell the truth, because if the client does not, other facts that may
come to light, or the client's own testimony at a later proceeding, may
conflict with what the client says now;
6. explain the legal consequences to the client and try to establish
whether the answer, true or false, is likely to be contradicted by any-
one at a later time; or
7. assume that this decision is a strategic one that falls within the
province of the lawyer, not the client, and either (a) make the decision
in the client's interest that, whatever the truth of the matter, short-
term withholding of the document is in the client's interest, or (b)
make the decision that the long-term interests of the client and the
basic goals of the justice system favor turning over the document un-
less it is clearly privileged; and structure questions about how it was
prepared to achieve the chosen end.
Similar dilemmas, calling for a similar discretionary range of deci-
sions, pervade litigation practice. How should counsel phrase instruc-
tions or guidance to corporate personnel about what documents to
search for or how to respond to questions in depositions? In particu-
lar, how much guidance should counsel give on the responses most
likely to be inculpatory, on the tacit assumption that the client will
take this as a hint to evade responses in those areas? Given in-house
counsel's blanket assurance that all relevant documents and the names
of all knowledgeable personnel have been produced, should outside
counsel probe behind that assurance? If documents are made avail-
able in response to requests, will counsel see to it that they are in-
dexed and collated or simply give access to warehouses and put the
burden on plaintiffs to find the needle in the haystack?
To a very large extent, as our informants repeatedly emphasized,
the choice of approach will be dictated by the instructions or, in the
absence of instructions, by the perceived situation, interests, and
desires of their clients. A client in a weak position on the law and
facts will obviously adopt a different position in discovery from the
client who can only gain by frank disclosure; a client who is deter-
mined to deter future litigation and resist disclosures that might harm
it in later lawsuits is likely to be more obstructive and determined to
raise costs for the other side than the client who wants to settle cases
quickly to keep within the limits of an insurance reserve. The lawyers
defending employment-discrimination cases said that they were much
more likely to be forthcoming and try to keep overall costs down than
the lawyers defending products liability actions. "In bet-the-company
cases, to get to a settlement, you may have to fight the discovery
wars."
Importantly, choosing an approach will also depend on the conduct
of adversaries: several of our lawyers described their practices as
starting out civilly and cooperatively, but eventually responding in
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kind to hyper-aggressive conduct from the other side. In other words,
their general policy was, "No first strike," but also, "Tit-for-tat." Even
so, my impression was that our informants tended to differ considera-
bly, even after taking into account differences in their types of prac-
tice, clients, and adversaries, in attitudes towards how active or
passive the lawyer should be in making, or guiding clients to make,
discretionary gray-area judgments. Some took the position that coop-
eration was their default stance until or unless plaintiffs demonstrated
unreasonableness. Others, by contrast, argued that polite resistance-
making the other side work hard for every single document-was sim-
ply the obligation of zealous advocacy, that withholding is a rational
jockeying for negotiating position: "Disclose as little as possible
before the ground rules are established. It's in your interest not to
turn anything over but to have some 'integrity" before the court[.]
[Y]ou risk dismissal if you don't produce something." Some believed
these decisions were primarily tactical and ethical ones for the lawyers
to make; others believed that client instructions or the desire to give
the client what it apparently wanted determined everything.
C. Explanations of Prevalence or Differences in Borderline Conduct
Once our informants began to talk about differing levels of ethical
practice, they speculated in very interesting ways about possible
causes. This section outlines some of the major candidates for expla-
nations of variations in borderline conduct.
1. Outsiders
At least while speaking in their "official" voices, our groups of
large-firm lawyers insisted that ethical violations and disreputable
gray-area tactics were infrequent at their level of practice-large firms
with reputations for ethics and civility to maintain. But they thought
such violations and tactics were much more common outside that
level, chiefly in the plaintiffs' bar but also in some firms (New York
City firms were often mentioned) that cultivated reputations for ill-
mannered hardball or "scorched earth" practice. When large-firm
lawyers did engage in problematic conduct, our informants usually at-
tributed it to outsiders.6 Some firm lawyers, for example, suggested
that when marginal conduct was a problem in their own firms, its
source was often "laterals," partners recruited to the firm for their
business book and not adequately socialized to the restraints of their
firm's culture. Most often, however, partners attributed problematic
5. Ironic quotation marks.
6. This is the type of explanation that our Task Force colleague Robert Nelson
has called the "Circle of Blame." See Robert Nelson, The Discover, Process as a Cir-
cle of Blame: Institutional Professional, and Socioeconomic Factors that Contribute to
Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham
L. Rev. 773 (1998).
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behavior as resulting from provocations of adversaries, pressures
brought to bear by clients, and inadequate supervision by judges. As-
sociates most often located the source of pressure in "overaggressive"
partners. More on these influences follows below.
2. Firm Culture
Although the lawyers generally agreed that ethically dubious prac-
tice was not a big problem in firms like theirs, they disagreed to a
surprising extent on the importance of the firm as an institution for
inculcating or maintaining standards of ethical practice.
Some partners and associates insisted that their firms had strong
cultures, which ensured practice standards well above the floor, and
mentioned some specific institutional controls: regular feedback from
associates on partners' conduct, a requirement that threats of sanc-
tions be cleared through committee, and even (though no one could
say how seriously this was taken) adherence to ethical practice as a
formal criterion in promotion and compensation. "Firm culture isn't a
luxury; it's our bread and butter, our reputation; people come to us for
integrity." The most effective institutional control was the original se-
lection of associates. Believers in the strong firm also stressed the
firms' insulation from the crudest forms of economic pressure as giv-
ing more latitude for ethical and cooperative conduct.
Other lawyers were more skeptical. They pointed, again, to the
fragmentation of firm culture as firms have become larger and more
heterogeneous, and to the decentralized organization of litigation
practice: autonomous work teams not monitored by other partners.
"You can't mentor partners. We had a partner who misbehaved in
many situations, before opposing counsel and even judges; eventually
he left the firm." Lateral partners brought in to the firm "are toler-
ated if they don't stay within the bounds of proper conduct for a
longer time; they are treated differently." Partners rarely observe one
another at work; if feedback comes at all, it is from lawyers at other
firms or judges. Associates also felt that they were working mostly on
their own in discovery practice and that they were under pressure to
work quickly and not to make mistakes, but received little supervision
and feedback from their partners. One partner offered a compromise
view: large law firms generally are too big and fragmented to have a
culture, but litigation departments are still often cohesive enough to
have and impart strong cultures.
Above all, there were few positive incentives, other than self-re-
spect and the good opinion of judges and of lawyers from other firms
to practice ethically. Partners said clients exerted pressures toward
hardball and borderline behavior; associates said such pressures came
from both clients and partners, but particularly from partners. As one
associate said, "There is no ... market for ethical practice." Associ-
ates felt that virtually all their incentives were to play the discovery
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game so as to disclose as little as possible. There was no reward for
cooperative behavior, only the serious risk of premature disclosure of
facts that some partner would conclude had compromised the client's
settlement or litigation position.
3. Structural Causes
In all of our sessions, lawyers tended to point to aspects of the
changing character of practice as a source of structural incentives to
ethical violations and gray-area stretches. An attempt to generalize
and summarize these structural factors follows:
1. The increasing competition among firms for clients, and of law-
yers within firms for rewards based on attracting clients, has a damp-
ening effect on ethical scrupulousness. This is especially so because
clients often are over-impressed by hyper-aggressive lawyering and re-
gard cooperative behavior or the attempt to establish mutual trust re-
lations in litigation as a betrayal of their interests.
2. The dilution of cultures or conventions of trust, cooperation, and
mutual restraint by growth in firm size, specialization, and cultural
heterogeneity within firms (from increasing recruitment of laterals)
and the litigation bar generally, except in smaller towns or cities or
very specialized practices (like Delaware corporate practice), which
are still controlled by repeat-player insiders who all know each other
and have to deal with each other all the time.
3. Clients are demanding more service at lower cost and are scruti-
nizing costs more clearly. They are much less willing to subsidize
training and mentoring of associates, who increasingly run discovery
practice in their own autonomous, unsupervised void. Everyone in
the firm feels the pressures of overburdened time and the need to
make snap decisions on insufficient sleep and reflection: "There's too
much to do and no time to think," and in any case there is no standard
billing category for such things as, "Time for consultation and deliber-
ation on ethical issues."
4. It is harder to counsel clients to avoid illegitimate or borderline
tactics because it is less likely that lawyers will have established rela-
tions of trust and confidence with clients who hire them by the case,
rather than the whole firm as its outside general counsel. In any
event, in-house counsel often wants to dictate litigation strategy,
budget, and even tactics. This division of responsibility can lead to
ethical problems. There is a constant potential of an adversary rela-
tionship with a client. "You have to be skeptical about the accuracy of
information [a client provides]. It's very frightening to me-business
people sometimes have bad facts that they don't want to share with
yOU."
5. Because firms are no longer loyal to their lawyers, or their law-
yers to them, lawyers are more likely to engage in ethically marginal
behavior to impress clients in order to ensure that the clients will be
1998]
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portable if the lawyer leaves the firm. To put it another way, insecu-
rity and mobility lead to lack of firm cohesion; in turn, lawyers have
some incentive to favor marginal behavior over the firm's professional
standing or reputational interest, because they cannot be sure over
time that whatever benefits the firm will benefit them individually. At
the same time, ethically marginal conduct is more likely to be over-
looked by partners who are also big business-getters.
6. Firms are less likely to regard associates as lawyers in training for
a lifetime membership in the firm than as a transient labor pool, only
a few of whom will make partner. Those few will have to demonstrate
client-getting and client-pleasing skills as well as professional compe-
tence. An associate who raises an ethical objection, or even just a
question, about what a partner or client wants is taking a risk of being
perceived as a difficult or obstructive person (or, as one associate who
raised such a question told us he was labeled in a partner's evaluation,
"argumentative"). An associate whose ethical fastidiousness poses
the risk of displeasing or even losing a client will not last long.
7. Without the discipline of the informal sanctions of face-to-face
communities, litigation practice is a classic prisoner's dilemma: in
many cases both sides would gain more from cooperation, but each
stands to lose if he or she cooperates and the other side doesn't.
This structural account is, then, a story of the weakening of bonds,
and with them interests in reputation and continuing relations. Cli-
ents have less commitment to lawyers; lawyers have less commitment
to firms; lawyers have no bonds or reputational stake with a commu-
nity of lawyers; and (the associates expressed this somewhat bitterly)
partners have no commitment to associates. A partial dissent from
this view came from some of the women lawyers among our infor-
mants, who felt that the old solidarities had excluded them, and that
the new conditions of practice opened up more opportunities for them
to cultivate valuable long-term relations, both with partners and with
in-house counsel, often staffed by other women.
The most interesting, but much disputed, especially by the partners,
structural account we heard from several of the associates was the
generational hypothesis that pressure for borderline ethical behavior
or hardball comes mostly from mid-level partners. Mid-level partners
"will fight on every document" and "are much more difficult to deal
with on discovery .... Older lawyers have more trial experience; they
have seen OBSTRUCTION blown up on poster board." Some law-
yers speculated that this generational difference, if it exists at all, has
some relation to changes in billing practices-that hardball lawyering,
especially obstructiveness in discovery, is a particularly important part
or function of hourly billing.
In sum, we cannot claim to have found out anything reliable about
the actual incidence of ethical violations or ethically dubious border-
line gray-area behavior (even if we had a clear operational definition
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of the latter, which we do not have). In any case, incidents would be
hard to establish because most of it would be unreported, and a rise in
reports might say more about reporting or enforcement than about
underlying behavior. Our method has been focused more on trying to
elicit our informants' perceptions of problems and their sources. And
it is striking that once the discussion gets past the standard take-the
initial position of denial that there are any problems-our informants
do, by and large, seem to think that ethically dubious practices have
been increasing, and are inclined to attribute that increase first to het-
erogeneity-growing numbers of "outsiders"-and, second, to struc-
tural features of the new practice: larger firms, more competition,
more bottom-line orientation, more pressure and less time, more cli-
ent control, fewer bonds of continuing relationships among members
of the litigation bar, partners in firms, partners and associates, and
lawyers and clients.
D. Remedies
On the subject of remedies the lawyers in our groups genuinely
tried to be helpful, though they were not very hopeful. Suggestions
for remedies from inside firms included: regular associate feedback
on partners' behavior (to correct for the fact that partners don't moni-
tor one another); limiting lateral recruitment (growing slowly from the
bottom up); instituting some auditing mechanisms (some sort of peer
review); and reducing associates' incentives to overstate time spent
and "leave no stone unturned" in discovery by reducing reliance on
billable hours as a criteria for promotion. More radical proposals in-
cluded tying compensation of partners more closely to complaints
about their ethical behavior and becoming more discriminating in ac-
cepting clients who bring pressures for ethical violations: "Stop ca-
tering to clients who want one-stop service." By far the most frequent
suggestions for reform was more outside monitoring by judges: for
more judges, smarter judges, and judges more involved with cases
from the beginning.
There was, however, considerable skepticism about these remedies
from lawyers who felt the main sources of pressure to hyper-adversary
conduct came from the plaintiffs' bar and from clients and competi-
tion for clients rather than from within the firm, and that judges could
realistically only monitor lawyers immediately in front of them.
Additionally, according to the standard take, there is not much of a
problem to be remedied anyway. "Worrying about these issues at all
is a luxury of the top ten to twenty percent; lawyers with a high-vol-
ume practice don't worry about them." "Ethical behavior 'beyond the
rules' is fuzzy and vague . .. [describing someone as] 'hardball' or
'aggressive,' it's really a matter of style and personalities. Is it a prob-
lem to be an aggressive lawyer? It's hard to find fault with these
things."
19981
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II. THE WORLD AS IT LOOKS TO OTHERS: JUDGES, PLAINTIFFS'
LAWYERS, AND IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
In order to get a check, or at least some varying perspectives, on
what the large-firm lawyers told us about their practices, we inter-
viewed samples of groups of those who most often had dealings with
them in litigation settings: judges (including some magistrates), mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' bar, and inside counsel (general counsel or other
senior in-house counsel).
We were all struck by how very different litigation practice and the
role of large firm litigators within it looks to these other actors in the
system. We expected some differences. Differences in social and in-
stitutional roles, in self-interest and the interests of clienteles, are
bound to translate into differences in ideology and perceptions of real-
ity. Because all of our informants also were lawyers, we also expected
to find some similarities among people trained and socialized into the
same profession, even a profession as stratified and balkanized as the
legal profession. We did find some similarities in the way that all the
groups perceived current problems, diagnosed their causes, and sug-
gested remedies, but we were most struck by the differences. Law is
not a unified profession. These lawyers inhabit very different social
and cultural worlds, live under very different regimes of pressures and
incentives, and interpret reality very differently from one another.
A. Judges
The judges' general reaction to discovery tactics in litigation might
best be described as exasperated impatience with what they see as
wasteful, pointless, inefficient game-playing that devours scarce time
and judicial resources and interferes with settlement on the merits.
Unlike the large-firm lawyers who see discovery abuse, at least by the
defense bar, as sporadic and marginal, judges see it as frequent and
pervasive. As one judge observed, "In practice [the discovery rules]
have become a cash cow in which people vigorously create discovery
fights; a lesson in hiding the pea." Asked what the main causes are,
judges pointed to many of the same factors as firm lawyers do. Some
discovery gaming, they think, results from lawyers running the meter
to churn fees; some from hyper-cautious associates, "young attorneys
afraid to release documents they think might be damaging"; and some
from the culture of law firms that fighting everything has a value for
its own sake, regardless of results. For the most part, the judges em-
phasized the perceived need to impress clients.
[Defense counsel] is under a lot of pressure. In-house counsel is the
master .... "I want the toughest SOB in your firm." "Tough" is
good. The message is very clear: scorched earth. The lawyer is
thinking, "if I want to keep this client, I'm going to have to show
what a macho guy I am." Pressure is coming from clients. There's
very little interest in saying, "Let it all hang out."
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Pressure to impress clients has increased with the decline of continu-
ous relationships between lawyer and client, the increase in one-shot
hiring, and the need for repeat business. "In the old days, you were
connected to the client, firm to principal." Some judges also pointed
to the attenuation of responsibility that comes with two tiers of repre-
sentation, in-house and outside counsel. Lawyers are pictured as ob-
structions to rational cooperation.
Sometimes we'll go over the lawyers' heads, order the principals in,
talk to clients: "Are you tired of paying bills?" We have to get
around this Byzantine system, to get to the merits of the cases.
We have inherent powers. In mass torts, CEOs would come
down with lawyers; they asked if they could sit and talk. Recently in
a business case, parties asked if they could work without lawyers,
forget motions and discovery. We settled it, the parties and me.
Who's the client? If in the General Counsel's office, that's one
thing; if the CEO you get a different perspective. The trick is to find
[people] who will authorize settlement; [we] can treat them like
statesmen.
The plaintiffs' lawyers we talked to thought that judges, particularly
federal judges, were biased against plaintiffs' lawyers and blamed the
judges for discovery disputes. That may be so, but possibly because of
the judges selected or the directing of questioning toward defense
conduct, we saw little sign of it. "The main problem with [the defense
bar] is hiding the pea; a couple of very large law firms do that as a
matter of practice." "Withholding of documents is where you get the
most misconduct." "There is a built-in reluctance to turn over some-
thing that's against interest." "Who's getting paid by the hour? Who
has got the documents and the money?"
The judges also attributed problems to more general causes such as
the deterioration of cultural values and professional standards. Of all
the groups, the judges were the ones most frequent to believe that
ethical behavior had declined.7 Again, they place some of the blame
on competitive pressures within firms. "In the 1970s, [partners] had
the time to get involved [in supervision of ethics of younger lawyers]."
Now, the partners' attitude is: "Produce billable hours or you're out
on your butt. If you want loyalty, buy a dog." "The standard has
become, 'What can I get away with and still be within the rules."'
The judges are aware that their active participation is essential to
resolving discovery disputes. "It's hard for lawyers to give in without
[a judicial order]." "It's easier for a lawyer to explain to a client that
[discovery has been] ordered by a judge." Nonetheless, they intensely
dislike getting involved in such disputes. "None of us wants to spend
more time on discovery." One judge lamented that
7. This perception may, of course, simply reflect the change in perspectives that
resulted when they shifted roles from litigator to judge.
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Discovery disputes are a nuisance.... If a lawyer seeking to compel
seeks sanctions, there's a litigation within the litigation, cross-mo-
tions for sanctions. We [judges] have different interests; we want to
get to the truth. We want to resolve cases on the merits. If we
award sanctions, we are saying, let's keep this pettifogging game
going.
Moreover, the judges say, other authorities will not support their sanc-
tions of lawyers. The state judges, in the jurisdictions where we inter-
viewed, said that state appellate courts will not uphold sanctions.
Disciplinary boards are reluctant to proceed against even plain and
gross violations. State judges facing re-election have to be wary of
sanctioning members of powerful bar associations whose endorsement
is important.
Some of the judges were experimenting with improvements in man-
aging discovery that they believed would be useful. In mass tort cases,
judges could take an active role in setting up document depositories
and systems by which documents could be transferred in an orderly
way. Most agreed that, whether or not the new Rule 26 had been
adopted (it had not, in the jurisdictions we studied), discovery confer-
ences should be scheduled early, possible sanctions should be made
clear in advance, and firm deadlines should be set.8 Where feasible,
sanctions should take the form of preclusion of claims or defenses or
of instructions to the jury that documents were not produced because
of tactical advantages of not producing them.
B. Plaintiffs' Lawyers
It is important to mention that the plaintiffs' lawyers we interviewed
represented, like the defense lawyers, a special cut of the bar: success-
ful lawyers who can, to a large extent, pick their clients and their
cases. Our primary focus in interviews was, once again, their exper-
iences with our study's main object of interest, large-firm defense law-
yers and their conduct in litigation, especially discovery. On this
subject, there was a major division of opinion among the plaintiffs'
lawyers. Some (a minority) felt strongly that actual dishonesty, "lying,
cheating and obstruction" were all pervasive in the defense bar. Some
(also a minority) argued to the contrary that the adversary system usu-
ally worked as it was supposed to, that if plaintiffs played the game
skillfully they could in fact extract relevant documents from firm law-
yers. These lawyers thought the main problem with Fisons,9 a case
8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (stating the general provisions governing discovery and
the duty of disclosure).
9. Washington St. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054,
1074-85 (Wash. 1993) (holding, in part, that the trial court abused its discretion when
it refused to apply sanctions for discovery abuses). Study participants were presented
with a fact pattern based on Fisons. See Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 691, app. at 885-87 (1998).
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involving deceptive responses to discovery requests that the research
team used to prompt discussion, was the plaintiff's incompetence at
not responding to the fairly clear "red flag" sent up by the defense.
Most of the plaintiffs' lawyers, I think, were in the middle. They
believed that actual dishonesty, such as outright lying and deliberate
destruction of documents, does occur, though it is relatively infre-
quent, but that ethically problematic evasiveness, obstructionism, and
delay were pervasive. Defense lawyers will not tell deposition wit-
nesses to lie, but will tell them to evade and spin stories, and will in-
struct them in what an exculpatory story should sound like. Also,
plaintiffs' lawyers will give all requests the narrowest possible inter-
pretation; if they are asked to search for "letters," they will fail to
produce "memoranda." Plaintiffs have to ask for the same documents
"six to seven times" to get them. They must carefully build a record to
seek a motion to compel and to seek sanctions, if necessary. Some
plaintiffs' lawyers accept this behavior as a normal feature of the ad-
versary process; most, however, are more critical, seeing it as a perver-
sion of the spirit and purpose of the discovery rules. They attribute it
primarily to the economics of large-firm practice, the need to bill
hours and to impress clients: "The firm has 100-150 litigators that it
can't support if it did what it's supposed to."
Asked whether in-house or outside counsel were better to deal with
in discovery, our informants related different experiences. Some pre-
ferred dealing with outside counsel law firms because outside counsel
were less personally invested in outcomes, less ideological, and (espe-
cially if frequent adversaries) were more likely to have continuing re-
lations leading to mutual trust. Others would rather deal with in-
house counsel directly because inside counsel had less incentive to
simply "keep the case going," were more interested in the substance
or merits of the claim, and had no other client to impress by being
unreasonable. Most lawyers agreed that the two-tiered system of rep-
resentation, in-house and out-house, made it easier for corporations to
hide documents. All the lawyers could preserve deniability and save
themselves the necessity of outright lying by "layering" responsibility
for discovery.
On two particular points, the plaintiffs' lawyers were especially in-
tense. They were more critical of judges than of the defense bar.
Their view is clear: the discovery rules (on the whole) favor plaintiffs;
judges are supposed to enforce the rules, but they do not, partially
because (as all the lawyers and the judges agree) they dislike discov-
ery disputes, treating them as quarrels between bickering children, but
also because judges, especially federal judges, are strongly biased
against plaintiffs' lawyers. Defense lawyers are able to stall indefi-
nitely and count on non-enforcement of the rules because of this bias.
Some plaintiffs' lawyers believe they rarely get more than thirty per-
cent of the relevant documents, even after years of trying, though
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others say that if they are patient and carefully build a record, even
biased judges will eventually compel production. Federal judges do
not like personal injury disputes. Rather, they prefer commercial
cases, and, most of all, dealing with law-firm lawyers with whom they
share a common class background and cultural style.
Differences of class and style between the plaintiffs' bar, on the one
hand, and corporate lawyers and judges on the other, was a theme to
which these lawyers repeatedly returned.
Judges look at the plaintiffs' bar and are a little jealous. We're mak-
ing too much money. We have to file fee applications; at the end of
the day we have to genuflect and kiss their ring. Judges see us as
pariahs; they come out of backgrounds with two serfs doing their
work. We take tremendous risks, like an entrepreneur.
Judges enforce a double standard. If a plaintiff[s' lawyer] screws
up, he's on the carpet. Defendants are just admonished.
In their minds, these factors accounted not only for judicial bias
against them, and in favor of representations of their adversaries, but
also accounted for a good deal of the gratuitous incivility and misbe-
havior in civil litigation. The plaintiffs' lawyers believe that their ad-
versaries unduly personalize disputes and are hyper-aggressive in
discovery and depositions because their adversaries fundamentally
suspect the motives and trustworthiness of plaintiffs' lawyers. Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs' lawyers, defense lawyers view plaintiffs' suits to be
extortionate strike suits and the lawyers to be greedy and unethical.
"Law firms are bloody, really bloody." Plaintiffs' lawyers agree that
their style, background, and ideology differ from those of the defense
bar-plaintiffs are more flamboyant in dress, quicker to doubt the in-
tegrity of the business world, etc.-but also insist that, at least at their
level of practice, most of their cases have merit.
Plaintiffs' lawyers are critical of many of the remedies for discovery
abuse. Those that have had experience with the new Rule 2610 do not
believe it has changed much. They are suspicious of sped up calen-
dars, believing they work in defendants' favor in cases requiring
lengthy discovery. They are ambivalent about special discovery
judges or magistrates. They like the fact that special magistrates have
more experience, but dislike their inclination "to cut the baby in half,"
believing that it encourages plaintiffs in the wrong direction, to be
more broad in their requests. They would like to see more vigorous
enforcement by judges, and real consequences for repeated failures to
produce, such as dismissal or preclusion of defenses or issues.
C. In-House Counsel
In-house counsel occupy a dual role as lawyers-for-a-client, the
management, and as part of that management. Their views of litiga-
10. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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tion, the adversary process, and the discovery game are naturally con-
ditioned by that duality. As lawyers, they embrace the norms of the
adversary system: plaintiffs have to ask the right questions, the de-
fense does not have to put together the plaintiff's case, it is legitimate
to try to narrow requests, seek protective orders, and present plaintiffs
with masses of data to sort through, so long as one has a colorable,
legitimate basis for doing so.
As managers, however, the priorities of in-house counsel are some-
what different: they worry about cost and reputation. "The discovery
game has more to do with generating fees . . . . Plaintiffs ask for
overly-broad discovery so they can trap us into not producing so they
can ask for sanctions. I hate to get into these awful games." "Outside
counsel want to play these $100,000 games. Inside counsel say, 'Let's
focus on the issue and get it done, resolved."' "If I have someone
who's in a fight at every deposition, I don't want to be paying for that;
have plaintiff go running to the judge." Inside counsel's primary con-
cern is efficient case management, which is cost-effective litigation.
They are most likely to pull out all the stops to resist discovery, to
take the pure litigator's view, is when exposure is the greatest. As one
in-house counselor explained, "Where we have a document we don't
want to produce, we cast about for reasons not to produce" or seek
quick settlement before discovery proceeds further. The hardest-
fought cases, one lawyer suggested, are those in which a document is
not strictly relevant to the plaintiff's claim, but is powerful nonethe-
less. If such a document saw the light of day, it could injure the com-
pany's reputation or litigating position.
In-house counsel are, or at least report themselves to be, as con-
cerned about their company's public image. They base defense strat-
egy as much on the merits, real or apparent, of cases as on exposure;
they repeatedly speak of wanting to "do the right thing" if there is a
valid case against their company; and they certainly do not want to see
their company written up "in The Wall Street Journal" as a corporate
malefactor. "You're representing an institution, you can't afford a
perception that you're cutting corners."
For our special purposes, the in-house counsel were probably most
revealing when they spoke what they were looking for hiring outside
counsel. They understood the perception that they always want coun-
sel who will be as aggressive as possible, but believed that it was often
a misperception. "People get scared, they get panicked: 'I'm going to
get fired if we lose this case."' Inside counsel are very instrumental;
they want results, as cost-effectively as they can.
We asked about firm lawyers' belief that "there's no market for eth-
ical practice." Our outside counsel agreed that this belief was gener-
ally accurate, that a reputation for dealing "in the utmost good faith"
was not a criterion for selecting firms. On the other hand, in-house
counsel did not want a firm known to be unethical because such a firm
1998] 725
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
might get them into trouble. There was, however, a niche market for
highly ethical counsel, where a client needs to restore its good name
with judges or regulators (Fisons, it was suggested during our conver-
sations, might want to hire such lawyers after its debacle);1" there was
also a niche market for "junkyard dogs" when all-out scorched-earth
resistance was needed to save the company. Sometimes, according to
our participants, outside firms were fired because they were not ag-
gressive enough, or were not aggressive in the right way; they were
more interested in churning paper and filing motions than in winning.
For routine litigation, several of the general counsel said they were
turning to lower-cost, smaller firms to handle all work of a certain
type on a fixed annual budget. Law firms who will not negotiate
lower rates, they suggested, are "shooting themselves in the foot."
On the whole, the in-house lawyers were extremely unsympathetic
to outside lawyers' claims that increasing competition and pressure
from clients are eroding valuable components of professionalism. If
"professionalism" means craftsmanship or "quality work," outside
counsel see it as wasteful or, at any rate, unaffordable luxury. It is the
complaint of partners who want to maintain $400,000 incomes in the
face of increasing competition. "One of our objectives is to lower
[outside counsel] incomes." "I'm required to live within a budget; I
have no sympathy for a lawyer who's earning a lot more than I am."
If professionalism means autonomy in work conditions, this has to be
sacrificed in favor of clients' needs to keep costs down, to scrutinize
bills, and to refuse to pay for items like "reorganizing our files." "Law
firms are so unresponsive to forward thinking; if you set a limit, they
take it as beating up on them."
How about the loss of the role of the "independent counselor" to
business clients? Outside counsel see that role as having been taken
over by themselves. "Lots of senior partners are disappointed with
diminished access to senior executives," but they don't see much so-
cial loss as a result. They view the outside lawyer as ethical guide to
the corporation as a myth. "It was a lie then; it's a lie now." Although
there are times when they find it useful to solicit outside counsel for
an "objective view" of corporate conduct, inside counsel can be more
independent than outside because "it's easier to get rid of a law firm
than the lawyers in the company."
Like all the other lawyers, in-house counsel believe that judges are
too unwilling to get involved in policing discovery and sanctioning
misbehavior. A mirror image of the plaintiffs' bar, they believe that
judges (in their case state-court judges who are more likely to come
from the plaintiffs' bar) are biased against them.
11. See Fisons, 858 P.2d at 1074-85; see also Report, supra note 9, at 885-87 (re-
printing the fact pattern given to our informants).
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For abuses in the litigation system, inside counsel are most inclined
to blame the tort system and the plaintiffs' bar. They say that lawsuits,
especially discovery, place enormous burdens on corporate defend-
ants to turn over warehouses of documents, so that plaintiffs can (1)
go fishing around for something that might possibly influence a jury;
(2) provoke the adversary into a defensive move that might trigger a
request for sanctions; or (3) pose the threat that the defense will be
put to vast expense searching for documents and will pay off to avoid
it. "Plaintiff walks in on an entitlement theory; 'I'm a plaintiff and I'm
entitled to damages; [let's] negotiate the number."' "It's laziness; 'you
produce and index and at some point I'll figure out what my claim
is."' In-house counsel tend to paint a very unfavorable picture of the
plaintiffs' bar, one full of opportunists out for their own profit who
often do not represent seriously injured people. They are critical of
what they consider to be a general popular culture of "entitlement,"
the notion that for every injury there must be a deep pocket who will
supply the remedy (if there's serious injury, the jury will "gloss over"
issues of causation and whether the product could have been designed
differently). When asked to suggest reforms, they called for reforms
in the tort system. Most frequently, they suggested some sort of
"loser pays" regime for attorney's fees, appointment rather than elec-
tion of state court judges, reform of class actions, and changes in dam-
ages rules (eliminate the collateral source rule and joint- and several-
liability, pain and suffering, and punitive damages) to reduce incen-
tives to sue. "We have a cowboy system in the U.S.... [There are] no
incentives to make a sensible early demand."
III. SOME PRELIMINARY GENERAL REFLECTIONS
I end with some general thoughts about what we have learned from
our project thus far. Specifically, I focus on the general shift among
lawyers from an internal ethics to an external concern for satisfying
the expectations of third parties.
A. Perhaps the Most Basic Problem: Adversary Practice
and Ideology
Our lawyer informants were usually exceptionally sharp and per-
ceptive observers of their own practices, with one significant blind
spot. With the limited exception of some of the judges, they were not
inclined to entertain the hypothesis that seemed to strike several of
the outside observers as the most plausible: to the extent lawyers en-
gage in ethically problematic conduct, the adversary system itself and
the ideology of adversary advocacy that goes along with it, i.e., the
master norm of zealous representation, significantly contributes to
such conduct.
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This is a blind spot because the adversary system and master norm
of zealous representation are the unquestioned core religion of law-
yers, litigators in particular. If a set of institutional practices and
norms fundamentally define your job, your role in society, or your
identity as a professional, you will find it difficult to admit that just
doing your job in the way it is supposed to be done may, in itself, be
the source of serious problems and adverse social consequences. You
will assume that if everyone plays the game according to the rules, the
results will be socially optimal, or, at least, acceptable most of the
time.
Civil discovery is one of the areas of current practice that raises
problems for this assumption. The discovery rules attempt to achieve
that what is, to some extent, unachievable: install a cooperative pro-
cess into the heart of adversary proceedings staffed by people trained
in adversary culture. Our justice system-as my colleague John
Langbein likes to point out 1 -is designed so that the accurate devel-
opment of facts in civil suits is not any person's or institution's final
responsibility; an approximation of truth is assumed to emerge from
mutual checking and canceling-out of one-sided adversary presenta-
tions and distortions, with judges given only a weak role as umpires
within the procedural game. Even judges can only effectively monitor
the game as it is played in open court. They cannot hope to do more
than superficial spot-checks of overreaching in requests for discovery
and depositions or of deceptions and withholding in responses to re-
quests for discovery. To the limited extent they can monitor, they do
not want to tie up scarce judicial time with collateral litigation over
claimed discovery abuse. Thus, lawyers should provide the mutual co-
operation required by the discovery rules. Almost everything in law-
yers' training, ideology, self-interest and clients' interest, however,
permits a lawyer to resist doing so.
For example, take a look at adversary ideology, the master norm of
zealous advocacy. At one time (in theory, anyway; what happened in
actual practice is obscure), lawyers generally understood that this
norm was constrained by, and had to be balanced against, other
norms, namely those general duties owed by lawyers as "officers of
the court" to the framework of substantive and procedural rules that
structure the adversary system. But over the course of this century,
especially in recent years, those general countervailing norms have
been both weakened and reduced to rules. Instead of being con-
fronted with two general obligations in permanent tension, which
must constantly be balanced against one another, lawyers face only
one dominant master norm: a client's interest is to be zealously ad-
vanced, qualified only by particular positive rules. "Ethics" has come
12. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 823, 841-48 (1985).
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to be defined primarily as following rules rather than making complex
judgments and applying internalized professional standards to particu-
lar situations. Lawyers believe that the rules of restraint, like any
other rules that restrict the client's interest, may be legitimately
"gamed," that is, narrowed, manipulated, and qualified by
interpretation.
It seems to me that our inquiries into specific practice contexts re-
vealed that there is more to the story than this. In actual practice,
conscientious and fastidious lawyers acknowledge and try to live up to
conventions of conduct over and above the floor minimum of obedi-
ence to rules. Rather, they try to remain faithful to higher principles
or standards of practice within the "gray areas." In other words, they
try to give some content beyond bare, narrow, reluctant rule following
to the public-professional norms of obligations to the integrity of the
legal system and its processes. But these conventions are very weak.
There is nothing to bind lawyers to them except a desire for self-re-
spect and reputation for admirable practice among other lawyers and
judges.13 The adversary ideology justifies successful or rainmaking
partners who do not respect these conventions or carry with them cli-
ents who disvalue them.
It seems obvious that if deviations from ethical conduct are not only
tolerated but also positively justified in certain situations, even ethi-
cally inclined lawyers will sometimes end up practicing very close to
the line (the floor set by the formal ethical rules). If that practice is
routinely close to the line, it should not be surprising that in situations
where the pressures and stakes are great, and detection seems un-
likely, lawyers should be tempted to cross it.
This is especially so because, for all their praise of the adversary
system, each side believes that the process, as presently structured,
gives opponents illegitimate advantages, which might require over-
reaching tactics to correct. Plaintiffs believe that defendants routinely
conceal documents, lie, evade questions on discovery, and delay for no
valid purpose other than to raise costs to adversaries and make them
go away. Defendants believe that plaintiffs often file actions with no
clue as to whether they are justified, ask for time-consuming and ex-
pensive discovery in the wild hope that it may turn up something in-
culpatory, or attempt to force the settlement through the nuisance
value of discovery. Plaintiffs are inclined to believe that almost every
business has nasty secrets that it will do anything to conceal. Defend-
ants think that this kind of "smoking gun" evidence is usually just a
single employee's (such as an engineer's) hypercritical assessment of a
problem, which a jury might read out of context as much more signifi-
cant than it is. Plaintiffs believe defendants have an unfair advantage
13. Although, as a number of lawyers pointed out, there are niche markets for
integrity, as well as situations in which the client has reason to value a lawyer with a
reputation for fair, honest, and cooperative dealing.
19981
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in federal court, where judges are pro-defendant; defendants believe
plaintiffs have an equivalent converse advantage in state court. Both
sides believe that they have to put up a convincing show of prelimi-
nary fighting over discovery in order to get the other side to see that
they are not pushovers and to consider reasonable settlement. To all
these justifications must be added the "law-has-become-a-business,
and we have to adjust to that" justification for overriding what may
seem to be hyper-fastidious professional scruples or prissy moralizing.
I take up this topic next.
B. The Erosion of Professional Moralism and the Rise of
Economistic Realism
Our interviews also shed some light on a basic shift in the ways that
lawyers have come to think and talk about ethical issues. This might
be called a trend away from "moralism" and towards "realist econom-
ism." I should make clear that these are "ideal-types." Most real peo-
ple combine moralist and realist styles of thought, applying different
mixtures of the styles to different contexts.
"Moralists" believe that people are variable along a spectrum of
character traits, more or less self-regarding or attentive to the welfare
of others; more or less honest, fair-dealing, and trustworthy or sneaky,
dishonest, and unreliable. To some extent, these are variations in indi-
vidual personality, in the legal profession as well as in other places
that one would expect a mix of types. But these traits are also cultural
and social. There are historical conditions, cultural environments, or-
ganizations, and methods of education and training that influence the
production of character. To a moralist, the way someone such as a
lawyer behaves in a particular situation is significantly a function of
the greater or lesser extent to which that person has learned and inter-
nalized a conception of himself as a moral being and a conception of
his practice as an ethical way of life. The stronger and more habitual
that self-conception, the more resistant it will be to outside incentives
and pressures to vary it.
"Realists"-I put this in quotes to indicate that I do not necessarily
accept this view as an actually more realistic picture of human nature
and conduct than the moralists'-tend to adopt the economist's or
"rational-choice" theorist's view that people are naturally self-seeking
and will simply respond to pains and penalties, incentives, rewards
and sanctions. "These are facts of life," as one of our informants said,
"we have to accept people [as they are]; if they go beyond the pale,
they should be sanctioned."
In our study the lawyers who spoke in moralist terms were likely to
express disapproval or outrage at the conduct of some or even most
other lawyers in litigation practice. They complain that these lawyers
are "pervasively dishonest and utterly fraudulent," prone to wholesale
"lying, cheating and obstruction" (a plaintiffs' lawyer on defense law-
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yers); that there has been a "general deterioration, a lot of intellectu-
ally incapable people getting to be lawyers ... interested only in the
bottom line" (a judge on the litigation bar generally), or that "Sammy
Glick is now the model of every MBA school, most everybody is get-
ting closer to used-car salesmen; nobody gives a damn about anything
but the bottom line." As another observed:
If you're representing [a corporate defendant] and have an unpleas-
ant document, the responsibility you have is determined by how you
see yourself-as a member of a learned profession and officer of the
court-or see yourself as someone in commerce, who's there to feed
the overhead and keep the machine going.
Lawyers, in their realist, mode are by contrast hard to scandalize; to
them, interest in the "bottom line" is not a special cultural or charac-
ter trait, but normal and predictable. Lawyers are businessmen oper-
ating in an adversary system; they will naturally serve their own
interests first, their clients' second, and anyone else's only to the ex-
tent of the risk that they will be caught and sanctioned if they don't:
I don't hold out much prospect that [we could convince most law-
yers that they] owe a higher duty to the profession and the court.
We could educate people more to rules and risks; in any bureaucra-
cies, people will risk their own future for the sake of advance-
ment. . . . We've constructed a system where people behave
rationally; we have to change incentives or educate to risks .... The
risk is: are you going to be the one holding the bag?
Lawyers are acting "rationally" in the Adam Smith sense.14 How
can a judge change the economics? ... We change economic man's
analysis if a judge says, "You're not discharging the responsibilities
of lawyers-you're off the case."
Few of the lawyers we talked to are pure moralists or realists.
Those inclined to moralism recognize that profit incentives are likely
to encourage, and the threat of sanctions to discourage, some forms of
behavior in most people; they also recognized that different people
will respond more or less honestly or selfishly, depending on their val-
ues as well as their assessment of risks, costs and benefits, to exactly
the same incentives. Further, even lawyers who are thoroughly realist
about their own group's practices do not hesitate to express moral
disapproval or even outrage about another group's practices: plain-
tiffs' lawyers about the defense bar, or defense lawyers about the
plaintiffs' bar.
Nonetheless, I think all of the observers were struck by the preva-
lence of realist modes of analysis and explanation in the lawyers we
interviewed. They were not, for the most part, cynics about the world
14. This particular judge used the term "rational" ironically. He added: "It's only
'rational' if the lawyer is willing to put aside [the role of) counselor, officer of the
court, professional responsibility."
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or the profession, and they did not wholly discount the importance of
moral and ethical concerns either in their own lives or those of others.
But even when alluding to moral and ethical concerns, they spoke as
realists do, about risks of possible damage to reputation. To put this
another way, the expressed ethics of most of these lawyers were exter-
nal and instrumental. When they spoke of "doing the right thing,"
they tended to define this term as respecting some external source of
authority or opinion: the civil discovery rules, ethics codes, judges'
orders, clients' orders and preferences. They clearly preferred utilita-
rian (cost-benefit) analysis to normative reasoning, and they exhibited
a positive allergy to moral language and an inclination to express even
the norms of basic truth telling and fairness in compliance with the
standard of some external standard or group. According to our study,
lawyers pondering a course of action will ask themselves, or each
other, how a description of it would sound in front of a spectator, how
it would sound to a judge, (often-mentioned) how it would look "in
the newspaper," "in the right hand column of The Wall Street Jour-
nal," or to their "mother." "You're going to be arguing to a judge in
front of your friends and family." Moral judgment, in other words, is
something that others possess and may bring to bear; the lawyer's task
is to anticipate that judgment. He does not consult some internalized
set of ethical or professional norms, such as what would be fair, hon-
est, and just, in this situation, or what is most consistent with the kind
of person or lawyer I would like to be. Rather, one asks, what would
others think?
What explains this behavior? The explanation is clearly not (much
popular opinion about lawyers to the contrary) that we are dealing
here with a bunch of amoral monsters or sociopaths who themselves
have no feelings or moral sense but a cunning instinct for maneuver-
ing around and manipulating the scruples of others. Nor, for that mat-
ter, is it plausible that lawyers are an abnormally humble group of
people who have so little faith in their own judgments that they can-
not take action without considering what other more confident folks
might think. On the contrary, most of the lawyers we talked to im-
pressed us as an exceptionally conscientious, honest and reflective
group of persons, men and women with well-developed internal ethi-
cal monitors. Some hypotheses follow.
Lawyers, through training and temperament, are suspicious of overt
moral discourse. They are used to the fact that disputes have many
different sides and plausible points of view, and they tend to believe
that moral language is usually a mask for hypocrisy or partisan ideol-
ogy. Clearly there is something to this-as illustrated by our lawyer-
informants themselves, who were ready to denounce the "greed" or
"dishonesty" of others belonging to outsider groups, but to interpret
their own behavior as rational response to incentives.
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Lawyers believe, usually with good reason, that clients (at least
business clients) are generally unresponsive, if not downright hostile,
to moral argument and persuasion, which is experienced as preaching.
Therefore, even if they have what is basically a moral point to make,
they will couch it in the instrumental terms of risk analysis: "If we do
this, there is a risk the judge will sanction us by dismissing our cross-
complaint." "Do you want to wake up in the morning and see the
headline in the New York Times, 'C. Co. Concealed Data on Poisoned
Baby Food"'?
More fundamentally, as I said before, the basic, overriding, domi-
nant norm of the legal profession, especially among litigators, is the
norm of zealous advocacy of clients' interests: a specialized role-
morality of fidelity to the goals and interests of clients that absolves
the lawyer of personal accountability for their service.' 5 In recent de-
cades, non-accountability-economism and business rationality have
risen to prominence alongside the traditional norm of zealous advo-
cacy as co-equal or dominant norms of the legal profession. This is in
large part due to an effect of rapidly increasing competition in the
legal profession, 6 but it is also related to more general cultural trends
that have spread into the traditional professions like law and
medicine. In purely economistic modes of thought, ethical and moral
choices are only "preferences," like the choice of fish over meat; thus,
the only way they can be discussed is in external terms. Business ra-
tionality is economistic reasoning of a special kind-cost-benefit anal-
ysis that counts costs and benefits, profits and losses, to a particular
business actor but not to anyone else; in this mode of reasoning, the
moral responses of others, such as approval or outrage at someone's
conduct, are only relevant if and to the extent that they translate into
effects on profits.
The spread of economism and business rationality has surely
brought with them many benefits to the profession. Notably, this is
manifested in a livelier concern with squeezing out waste and provid-
ing more cost-effective service. Of course, the business rationality of
law firms produces incentives to drive up the costs of litigation, but
the countervailing business rationality of their corporate clients, which
is increasingly dominant, acts as a control on uninhibited aggression in
litigation by reminding parties that the costs of keeping a cause going
can easily exceed any likely benefits. That is the positive side of the
recognition that law is, and must be conducted as, a "business." But
economism has also brought some costs. The down-side effects in-
clude the addition of yet another set of reasons, besides the adversary
15. This by itself is not enough of an explanation; for as we have seen, there are
lots of different ways of being a zealous-advocate-within-the-bounds-of-the-law. See
supra Part III.A.
16. See generally supra Part I (discussing the effect large firms have in advancing
these new norms).
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ideology, to discount or ignore entirely those aspects of professional
ethics that constitute the lawyer as a public officer with higher-than-
ordinary obligations to serve the public purposes of the legal system.
The evident public purposes of civil litigation, for example, are to
ensure that persons claiming violations of their legal rights will have
access to an efficient and affordable process that will adjudicate such
claims on their merits, to adequately compensate those with just
claims and to deter future violations by defendants and meritless suits
by plaintiffs. For anyone who has at heart the goal of promoting the
system's public purposes, the important question to ask about any liti-
gation practice like discovery tactics is: "What would happen to the
system if everyone did this? Would this practice, if repeatedly en-
gaged in, and unmonitored (or incapable of being monitored) by any
referee, seriously interfere with efficient and accurate fact-finding, res-
olution on the merits, access to justice, or deterrence of injurious prac-
tices or frivolous claims?" Generally, the lawyers we talked to treated
these questions as the proper concern of someone else-public actors
such as judges, legislators, and those with authority to enact practice
and ethical rules-rather than the day-to-day concern of the practic-
ing bar. Yet clearly, it is those very practitioners, most of whose con-
duct in litigation is necessarily unsupervised by any public authority,
whose day-to-day behavior will, in the last instance, determine
whether the system serves or disserves its public functions.
To be fair, many of the lawyers we interviewed did see beyond the
bread-and-butter of their practices to larger problems of the legal pro-
cess and the ends that it serves. Most of their complaints and ideas for
reform seemed, however, disappointingly partisan and ideological-
an agenda that favored their particular group of practitioners and its
clienteles. For example, the plaintiffs' lawyers believe judges should
do more to sanction defense delays in producing documents, but they
had little to say about deterring frivolous litigation or providing access
to justice for many small claimants whose injuries will not yield a con-
tingent fee. In-house counsel want "tort reform" imposing new barri-
ers to lawsuits but do not propose more efficient alternatives for
ensuring that injuries are compensated, deterring the marketing of un-
safe products, and assessing moral blame against corporate defendants
in appropriate cases. It is natural that practitioners should have points
of view conditioned by their interests but unfortunate that the views
should be so completely determined by their interests.
CONCLUSION
The basic themes emerging from our study are that a combination
of adversary system norms and operating assumptions, client de-
mands, and economic incentives are all inducements for corporate de-
fense lawyers-the special object of this Task Force's study-to
prolong and abuse discovery. Most of the norms of professionalism
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that might, and to some extent still do, contain these temptations have
been weakened in recent years by structural changes: growing compe-
tition of firms for clients, firms for lawyers, and associates for partner-
ship. These changes have increased heterogeneity in firms (lateral
recruitment) and in the litigation bar generally. Further, these
changes have eroded interests in avoiding unethical behavior in order
to preserve continuing good relations with adversaries and judges.
Most of the new incentives for lawyers, such as attracting and retain-
ing clients, push toward stretching ethical concerns to the limit
(though not over the limit if likely to be caught). We also gathered
some evidence from in-house counsel, however, that firm lawyers may
exaggerate the fear that they will lose clients if they do not put a show
of being hyper-aggressive in every litigation. The pressure on firm
lawyers to cut costs produces incentives in two directions. On the one
hand, it squeezes out discovery abuse motivated simply by a desire to
run up hourly billings to the client. Indeed, in much routine litigation,
discovery abuse in the form of meter-running is probably on its way
out as inside counsel increasingly audit bills and switch to fixed-priced
contracts. Cost-cutting, however, also squeezes out time for complex
qualitative judgments and money for training and supervising associ-
ates, while associates, who are left increasingly on their own to man-
age discovery, tend to reduce risks to their own careers by disclosing
as little as possible. The disposition towards adversary excess in dis-
covery also is reinforced by perceptions (based perhaps in part on
judgments about class and cultural style) that the other side is wholly
unscrupulous, so that escalation is justified.
Thus, the only checks on potential discovery abuse are outside mon-
itoring, firm monitoring, and internalized norms of professional self-
restraint. There is a general consensus that outside monitoring by
judges and magistrates is ineffective. Some lawyers and judges believe
it can be improved and have provided specific suggestions; others are
more skeptical. Monitoring by firms could also probably be im-
proved, but probably will not be, given the pressures on partnership
time, deference to partners with big business books, and the very de-
centralized organization of litigation into small work-teams, at least
without very determined professional leadership. The norms of pro-
fessional self-restraint in the interests of the integrity of the justice
system are quite weak and residual, and they are simply no match for
the countervailing norms of adversary ideology and business rational-
ity and the economic interests that those norms reinforce.
In the end, are the ethics of the conduct of litigation, especially dis-
covery abuse or overreaching, a serious problem? On this issue, our
informants were quite divided. The official line of large-firm liti-
gators, what I have labeled the "standard take," 7 is that unethical
17. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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behavior (defined narrowly as violations of the rules) is rare, that it is
engaged in mostly by plaintiffs' lawyers and a few rogue defense coun-
sel, and that it would cease to be much of a problem if judges would
take a more active role in monitoring. Further, large-firm litigators
suggested that "inappropriate" behavior falling short of rule-viola-
tions is a normal incident of the adversary process, sometimes justifi-
able as simply aggressive advocacy. The views of other participants-
judges, plaintiffs' lawyers and in-house counsel-are less benign, as
indeed are those of large-firm lawyers themselves when probed for
specifics beyond the official line. Though perceptions differ, there
seems to be some consensus that adversary excess is frequent, often
not by any standard justifiable as zealous representation, and that
many lawyers will indeed cross ethical lines when they think they can
get away with it, which, because of the weakness of monitoring agents,
they usually do. Though opinions differ about this too, most of our
informants seemed to think that ethically inappropriate conduct is on
the increase."'
Even so, is this a "problem"? My own sense is that high-level litiga-
tion is far from the most ethically problematic area of current law
practice, and that discovery abuse is far from the worst problem with
litigation practice. It is completely dwarfed, for example, by the ethi-
cal dilemmas posed for the plaintiffs' and defense bars by collusive
settlements and confidentiality agreements in mass-tort class action
litigation, which sell out the public's interest to the lawyers. Neverthe-
less, dishonest and hyper-aggressive behavior in discovery that raises
the costs of litigation and reduces the likelihood of disclosure of mate-
rial facts is certainly a "problem" for those who have to bear its costs,
18. Professor Linda Mullenix, one of the most careful and perceptive analysts of
the civil justice system and proposals for its reform, has analyzed many of the reports
calling for reform of the civil justice system on the ground that pervasive "discovery
abuse" has inflated the costs and delays of civil litigation. She finds that (a) the re-
ports rest almost entirely on anecdote, hearsay, or grossly unreliable survey evidence
of lawyers' and judges' opinions; (b) the most reliable empirical studies of civil litiga-
tion, such as the Federal Judicial Center study of 1978, have not found discovery
abuse to be a serious problem; and (c) that the movement for "reform" of discovery is
part of the general political agenda ("tort reform") of business defendants and their
insurers to limit their exposure to civil liability. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in
Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1994). Mullenix's caution is well-
taken. Our little study, based on the reports of informants, a sample of lawyers whose
representativeness is unknown, and who were not given any operational definitions of
misconduct to work with, is pretty nearly meaningless as a measure of actual inci-
dence of or increase in, "ethically inappropriate conduct." It may, however, be of
some value as evidence that well-placed lawyers and judges who are experienced re-
peat players at litigation perceive a problem-and perceive it among the lawyers
whom the "tort reform" movement does not usually point to as its source, large firm
corporate defense litigators-and as suggestive of the institutional and ideological
causes of the problem, to the (necessarily uncertain) extent that it does exist. Such
perceptions ought to stimulate, but can never substitute, serious empirical studies of
the civil justice system.
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including the clients who have to pay for adversary maneuvering, the
judges who have to pay in scarce time and attention, and the justice
system and the public at large, which suffer the loss of cost-effective
fact-finding and the resolution of disputes on the merits. The civil jus-
tice system remains the chief method we have for vindicating injuries
to the rights of plaintiffs and protecting defendants from harassing and
extortionate claims. It is a commons, like the water we drink and the
air we breathe. If its quality steadily deteriorates from pollution by
the lawyers who staff it as to make it too expensive to use and too
arbitrary to trust, it will become useless.
What can be done about it? We received many specific suggestions
from the lawyers we talked to for trying to change incentives and
monitoring mechanisms to raise the risks and costs of discovery abuse.
Many of these suggestions, like the recently (selectively) implemented
Rule 26 reforms in federal procedure, are well worth further experi-
ment and study. But all such reforms (as experience under Rule 11
showed all too convincingly) can be "gamed": evaded, worked
around, narrowed by interpretation, turned into another occasion for
adversary maneuvers, by a profession whose basic normative commit-
ments make it natural and legitimate to do so. It is those normative
commitments themselves-zealous representation of clients and busi-
ness rationality working in combination to reinforce economic self-
interest-that need to be made the subject of critical scrutiny. There
are countervailing values of professionalism, which, among the law-
yers we interviewed, only the judges were still willing to voice un-
equivocally. They stressed that lawyers have obligations to the
framework of justice, the purposes of the laws and procedural sys-
tems, obligations that sometimes trump those of loyalty to their clients
and the profitability of their firms. How do we reinvigorate those pro-
fessional ideals, how do we institutionalize them and make them effec-
tive in concrete practical ways? How do we get lawyers to internalize
them as they have internalized the norms of fidelity to clients, secrecy
of client confidences, and candor to tribunals? The lessons of experi-
ence are that successful systems of norms depend on shared under-
standings and informal sanctions of communities. Externally imposed
rules and sanctions of regulatory regimes can reinforce, but cannot
substitute, for such informal norms and sanctions. This in turn sug-
gests that the task for lawyers has to be the reconstitution of profes-
sional communities-this time around, without the ethnic, gender, and
class exclusions that disfigured the old communities. The attempt to
do this at the national level, through activities such as revising the
ABA's ethics rules, has backfired. I suspect that if this project is to
succeed, it will have to work through local bar committees and spe-
cialized subgroups. These subgroups can associations of products lia-
bility, employment, or securities litigators, which bring together
plaintiffs' lawyers, defense lawyers, judges, law professors and client
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groups in the search for practice standards that will help overcome the
prisoner's dilemmas of litigation and further the integrity of the justice
system. That is the challenge to the legal profession, and it is a colos-
sal one.
